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Quantum mechanics arguably provides the best evidence we have
for strong emergence. Entangled pairs of particles apparently have
properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the particles
taken individually. But at the same time, quantum mechanics is a
terrible place to look for evidence of strong emergence: the interpre-
tation of the theory is so contested that drawing any metaphysical
conclusions from it is risky at best. I run through the standard argu-
ment for strong emergence based on entanglement, and show how it
rests on shaky assumptions concerning the ontology of the quantum
world. In particular, I consider two objections: that the argument in-
volves Bells theorem, whose premises are often rejected, and that the
argument rests on a contested account of parts and wholes. I respond
to both objections, showing that, with some important caveats, the
argument for emergence based on quantum mechanics remains intact.
A strong form of holism or emergence is often taken to be a consequence
of quantum mechanics (Teller 1986; Hawthorne and Silberstein 1995; Wallace
and Timpson 2010; Healey 2016). I think this is basically right: quantum
mechanics provides us with good (though not incontrovertible) evidence that
physical systems have emergent properties. But the standard argument for
this conclusion in terms of entanglement is only part of the story. This
is because entanglement is a purely formal property of the mathematical
representation of certain quantum systems, and the interpretation of that
mathematical representation in the case of quantum mechanics is notoriously
contested.
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There are two related issues here. The rst is that the most direct argu-
ment from entanglement to emergence is via Bells theorem, but the major
interpretations of quantum mechanics all deny the assumptions of Bells the-
orem in one way or another. The second is that arguments for emergence
assume a model of wholes built up out of smaller parts that, while intuitive, is
controversial in the quantum mechanical context. I think these issues can be
addressed, but at the cost of adding some caveats to the claim that quantum
mechanics entails emergence.
The term emergence is used in a bewildering variety of senses, so let
me begin by specifying how I will use them here. I am interested in strong
rather than weak emergence, in Chalmers(2006) usage. That is, my con-
cern is whether there are high-level phenomena that are not deducible even
in principle from truths in the low-level domain, rather than truths that
are merely unexpected. In particular, I am interested in whether there are
cases in which this in principleepistemic block arises because of irreducible
high-level ontology. That is, by emergence I mean what Silberstein and
McGeever (1999, 182) call ontological emergence, namely the possession by
systems or wholes of causal capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic
causal capacities of the parts nor to any of the (reducible) relations between
the parts.
Emergence in this sense is closely related to what Healey (2016) calls
physical property holism, namely the existence of physical objects not all
of whose qualitative intrinsic physical properties and relations supervene on
qualitative intrinsic physical properties and relations in the supervenience
basis of their basic physical parts.Given some plausible assumptions, emer-
gence and holism in the above senses amount to the same thing. That is,
if causal capacities are a kind of property, and irreducibility entails lack of
supervenience, then a system that exhibits emergence also exhibits holism.
And if every physical property entails at least one unique causal capacity,
and lack of supervenience entails irreducibility, then a system that exhibits
holism also exhibits emergence. So from here on I use the two terms inter-
changeably. Glossing over complications concerning the nature of reduction
and of intrinsic properties, we can give a rough characterization of the target
phenomenon as follows:
Emergence (holism): A physical system exhibits emergence (holism) i¤ it
has properties that are not reducible to the intrinsic properties of its
parts.
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1 The case for emergence
Let us begin by examining the standard case for emergence (in the above
sense) based on quantum mechanics. An electron has a property called spin:
relative to a specied direction, the state of the electron can be spin-up,
written j"i, or spin-down, written j#i. The electrons state can also be a
superposition a j"i + b j#i of the spin-up and spin-down states in any pro-
portions a and b, where jaj2 + jbj2 = 1. If the spin of an electron in such a
state is measured, one obtains the result spin-up with probability jaj2 and
spin-down with probability jbj2.
Now consider a pair of electrons. Their joint state can be written e.g.
j"i1 j#i2, in which case the rst is spin-up and the second is spin-down. Sim-
ilarly, each electron can be in a superposition state (a j"ii + b j#ii), so that
the joint state of both electrons is (a j"i1 + b j#i1) (a j"i2 + b j#i2), which can
be expanded to a2 j"i1 j"i2 + ab j"i1 j#i2 + ab j#i1 j"i2 + b2 j#i1 j#i2. In this
case, if the spin of both electrons is measured, then for each electron there is
a probability jaj2 of obtaining spin-up and jbj2 of obtaining spin-down, where
these probabilities are entirely independent of each other.
It is also possible to prepare a pair of electrons in the state jSi =
1p
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j"i1 j#i2   1p2 j"i1 j#i2. The notable thing about jSi is that it is not
factorizable into a state of electron 1 and a state of electron 2. The lack
of factorizability is reected in the fact that the probabilities of obtaining
spin-up and spin-down for each electron are no longer independent of each
other: the outcome for electron 1 is spin-up i¤ the outcome for electron 2 is
spin-down. States like jSi are called entangled.
It is natural to regard entanglement as evidence for the existence of emer-
gence. The entangled state looks like a property of the pair of electrons, a
causal capacity responsible for the correlated outcomes we observe. But the
entangled state by denition cant be factored into a state of electron 1 alone
and a state of electron 2 alone: it is an irreducible state of the pair. Quantum
mechanics does allow us to assign states to the individual electrons such
states are called density operators but the individual electron states dont
entail the correlations between the measurement outcomes. So it looks like
the explanation for the correlations is in terms of an irreducible joint prop-
erty of the pair: the system composed of the two electrons has a property
that is irreducible to the properties of its constituent parts.
So far we have assumed that quantum mechanics constitutes a complete
description of the relevant causal capacities of the system, but this assump-
3
tion has been challenged (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). That is, one
might suspect that even if quantum mechanics, as it stands, doesnt represent
the properties of the individual electrons responsible for the correlations we
observe, nevertheless such properties must exist. Bells theorem (Bell 1964)
apparently rules out such a completion. Bell proves that, subject to some
plausible assumptions, no assignment of properties to the individual particles
can generate all the correlations we observe for pairs of entangled particles.
The entangled states that quantum mechanics assigns to such pairs of parti-
cles correctly predict all these observations. So it looks like the explanation of
the results we observe requires the existence of properties of pairs of particles
that are not reducible to properties of the particles taken individually.
This is arguably the best case we have for the existence of (strong, onto-
logical) emergence.1 But drawing any metaphysical conclusion on the basis
of quantum mechanics is a fraught enterprise, precisely because the inter-
pretation of the theory of quantum mechanics is so unsettled. This general
concern applies in particular to the case of emergence.
There are at least two aspects of the argument for emergence one might
worry about. First, it relies on the conclusion of Bells theorem. However,
many interpreters of quantum mechanics, including Bell himself (2004, 59),
regard Bells argument as a reductio of his assumptions rather than a direct
argument for his conclusion. Indeed, the three major realist interpretations of
quantum mechanics (Bohms theory, the GRW theory and the many-worlds
theory) all violate Bells assumptions in one way or another, and so avoid
the force of his conclusion. Second, the argument for emergence takes for
granted that the entangled state is ascribed to a compound system with two
individual electrons as parts. But the common-sense analysis of wholes into
smaller parts is also frequently challenged on the basis of quantummechanics.
I consider these di¢ culties separately, starting with the latter.
1Lancaster and Pexton (2015) argue for (strong, ontological) emergence based on the
fractional quantum Hall e¤ect, but since the heart of their argument is the role of entangled
states in the production of the e¤ect, this is not a separate line of argument. Chalmers
(2006) maintains that consciousness provides the only clear example of strong emergence,
but the conceptual issues surrounding consciousness are arguably even more contested
than those surrounding quantum mechanics.
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2 Conguration space realism
The spin of an electron is usually represented as a vector a quantity with
magnitude and direction. Vector quantities are quite familiar in physics: we
have no trouble understanding the velocity of an object as a vector-valued
property of that object. So we are initially inclined, I think, to think of spin
the same way as a vector-valued property of an individual electron.
But the mathematics of spin is less familiar than this analogy makes it
sound. The state j"i1 of a single electron is a vector in a two-dimensional
space not a three-dimensional space, as a direct spatial reading of spin
might lead you to expect. Still, one might be tempted to regard this vec-
tor as representing a property of the electron. However, the state j"i1 j#i2
of a pair of electrons is a single vector in a four-dimensional space. For
factorizable states like this one, the vector can be decomposed into a two-
dimensional vector for electron 1 and a two-dimensional vector for electron
2. But for non-factorizable states like jSi the four-dimensional vector cannot
be so decomposed.
So far, it looks like I have just been restating the argument for emergence.
But some have seen it as pointing towards a way to avoid emergent proper-
ties. Realists typically regard the mathematical structure of a theory as a
reection of the structure of the world. So if the mathematical representation
of the two-electron system inhabits a four-dimensional vector space, then we
should think of the fundamental ontology of the system as inhabiting a four-
dimensional space too. But then rather than thinking of the system as two
objects each bearing a two-dimensional vector property, we should think of
it as a single object bearing a four-dimensional vector property. So this isnt
a compound system after all (despite appearances), and the argument for
emergence fails before it gets started.
This view of fundamental ontology is usually expressed in terms of posi-
tion properties rather than spin properties. The position of a single particle
(at a time) can be represented using a wave function a complex-valued func-
tion of three spatial dimensions. It is natural to think of the wave function of
a single particle as analogous to a eld, dened by an amplitude and phase at
each point of three-dimensional space. But the position state of two particles
is represented by a complex-valued function of six dimensions, and in general
the position state of N particles is represented by a complex-valued function
of 3N dimensions. That is, the wave function of a compound system is rep-
resented in a conguration space a space in which each point corresponds
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to a specic conguration of all the particles in the system. When the wave
function is entangled, it cannot be factorized into separate wave functions
for each of the particles in the system, and hence cannot be represented in a
three-dimensional space.
Albert (1996; 2013) argues that since the wave function inhabits a multi-
dimensional conguration space, we should regard properties ascribed to
points of this space as the fundamental ontology described by quantum me-
chanics.2 Conguration space points are the basic physical parts. But in
that case, even entangled states supervene on the properties of the basic
physical parts of the system. Loewer (1996, 104) claims that it is an advan-
tage of this conguration space realist approach that it requires no emergent
properties that it vindicates David Lewiss Humean supervenience, in the
sense that every property of a system supervenes on the properties of its
point-like parts. Those point-like parts, however, are points of conguration
space, not points of ordinary three-dimensional space.
If Loewer is correct, then quantum mechanics does not entail emergence
after all, because we have misidentied the parts of the system in the argu-
ment of the previous section. Rather than a compound system consisting of
two fundamental entities (the electrons), we have a simple system consisting
of a single point-like entity. Hence it is irrelevant that we cannot factor state
jSi into a state of electron 1 and a state of electron 2: state jSi can simply
be ascribed in toto to the single point-like entity. We can still talk in terms
of electrons if we like, but they arent fundamental. The individual electrons
supervene on the fundamental ontology, in the sense that their individual
(density operator) states can be derived from state jSi.
There is something odd about this as an argument against holism, though.
According to the conguration space realist, the most fundamental ontologi-
cal part a single point in conguration space represents a possible cong-
uration of particles over the entire universe. This sounds like holism with a
vengeance, and seems to avoid holism on a technicality.
Let me try to diagnose more precisely the sense of shiness here. What
conguration space realism suggests is that our ordinary sense of what is
a part and what is a whole is mistaken. A conguration space point is a
basic part, even though it represents what we take to be the whole universe.
2Note that this is a controversial way of interpreting the quantum state; see the papers
in Ney and Albert (2013) for opposing views. But it is a contender, and hence might be
thought to provide a potential escape from emergence.
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And a single electron is a compound object, in the sense that its state can
contains contributions from many distinct conguration space points. And
the reason this is shy, I contend, is that partand whole, as they appear
in the denition of emergence at the beginning of this paper, are not technical
terms of an interpretation of quantum mechanics, but precisely terms used
in their ordinary sense.
That is, when we describe emergence as the possession by wholes of prop-
erties that are not reducible to the properties of their parts, we mean part
and wholein an intuitive sense, the sense in which a tine is part of a fork
and an atom is part of a molecule. In investigating holism, we want to know
whether something like a classical reductivist understanding of the physical
world is correct according to which the properties of partridges supervene
on the properties of particles, for example. This understanding presupposes
a picture of wholes and parts localized in ordinary three-dimensional space,
and a failure of this presupposition such that the basic parts are spread
over three-dimensional space is tantamount to holism. We can introduce a
technical vocabulary if we like, a vocabulary in which what we ordinarily call
a part becomes a whole, and what we ordinarily call a whole becomes a part,
and this technical vocabulary might have some theoretical usefulness. But a
terminological choice like this cant undermine an argument for emergence.
A conguration space realist might insist that we should follow the physics
in deciding what to call a part and what to call a whole, since physics is a
better guide to fundamental reality than ordinary language. Thats ne, but
I think it misses the point. Under such a proposal, all the properties of a par-
tridge would indeed supervene on the properties of the basic physical parts.
In fact, the instantiation of one basic physical part one conguration space
point would be su¢ cient to instantiate the partridge and all its properties,
so in a sense the partridge has no proper parts. Perhaps this is what physics
tells us. But if so, then physics tells us that electrons, partridges and galax-
ies are on a par as far as fundamentality goes. To conclude from this that
physics tells us that holism is false would be rather absurd.
What is needed, I think, is a small modication in the denition of emer-
gence/holism:
Emergence (holism): A physical system exhibits emergence (holism) i¤ it
has properties that are not reducible to the intrinsic properties of its
spatially local parts.
If conguration space realism is correct, and objects have no spatially local
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parts, then holism is trivially true. This seems exactly as it should be.
3 Priority monism
Even if you accept the argument of the previous section that radical rede-
nition of partand wholeshould not a¤ect whether quantum mechanics
entails emergence, you might still think that quantum mechanics challenges
the metaphysical priority of parts over wholes. This is the position defended
by Scha¤er (2010). Scha¤er contends that what we should take as funda-
mental is whatever can act as the relevant supervenience base. It looks like
individual particles or individual space-time points cannot function as a su-
pervenience base in quantum mechanics: for an entangled state, the state of
the whole does not supervene on the states of the point-like parts. But if
we turn our ontology on its head, supervenience is unproblematic. For the
two-electron entangled spin system, the state of each electron individually
supervenes on the state of the pair (in the sense that the density operator for
each electron can be derived from the entangled state jSi of the pair). Simi-
larly, the (density operator) position state of each of a system of N particles
can be recovered from the wave function of the N -particle system. In gen-
eral, we should take the physical state of the entire universe as fundamental:
everything else supervenes on that.
Scha¤er calls this view priority monism.3 Note that priority monism does
not challenge the ordinary conception of parts and wholes: a tine is still a part
of a fork, even if the fork is more fundamental. So priority monism is not a
direct challenge to the argument for emergence based on quantum mechanics;
indeed priority monism is motivated by the failure of supervenience of the
properties of wholes on the properties of their parts. But nevertheless there
is a sense in which priority monism might be thought to make emergence
beside the point.
The sense is this. Emergence can be understood as a failure of depen-
dence: the properties at one level fail to depend only on the properties at a
more fundamental level. While quantum mechanics may entail a failure of
supervenience of the properties of wholes on the properties of parts, this is
3Like conguration space realism, priority monism is controversial: see responses by
Bohn (2012) and Calosi (2014). But again like conguration space realism, it is a con-
tender, and hence might be thought to pose an indirect challenge to the argument from
quantum mechanics to emergence.
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not a genuine failure of dependence according to the priority monist, because
the dependence between the properties goes the other way up. The proper-
ties of the parts depend on the properties of the whole. If we understand
metaphysical dependence correctly, then there is no failure of dependence,
and the failure of supervenience of wholes on parts is not what we should be
concerned about.
If priority monism is correct, then there are no free-oating higher-
level properties: every higher level property is tethered by dependence to
properties at a more fundamental level. So priority monism might make
you feel better about emergence. One might even go further and argue that
the absence of free-oating higher-level properties means that there is no
real holism or emergence here. But it is hard to see how this could work.
Dening holism as the failure of dependence of parts on wholes is fairly clearly
absurd, since the existence of fundamental wholes is holism (as argued in the
previous section). Attempting to dene holism in terms of fundamentality
rather than parthood courts triviality: if "x is more fundamental than y"
means "y depends on x", then trivially everything depends on that which is
more fundamental. And even if the triviality can be avoided, the absurdity
remains, since one ends up asserting that irreducible wholes do not constitute
holism. Priority monism treats the symptoms of emergence, but it is not a
cure.
Earlier, I noted two worries you might have regarding the standard argu-
ment for emergence based on quantum mechanics. The second of these is the
one we have been considering that the argument presupposes a common-
sense analysis of wholes into smaller parts. My contention has been that
this presupposition is entirely appropriate: the sense of partand whole
appearing in denitions of emergence and holism is the ordinary sense, not
some technical sense that one might construct to overcome some of the in-
terpretive di¢ culties of quantum mechanics. So emergence is safe from any
redenition of partand wholesuch as is implicit in conguration space
realism. Further, any restructuring of dependence relations between parts
and whole, such as priority monism, leaves the argument for emergence un-
scathed. Priority monism might be an attractive way to understand a world
with emergent properties, but it doesnt undermine the existence of emer-
gence.
However, the rst worry I noted above remains: the standard argument
for emergence depends on Bells theorem, but most interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics reject the assumptions of Bells theorem. Let us turn to that
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now.
4 The case for emergence, revisited
The assumptions on which Bells theorem is based can be formulated in
various ways, but the following formulation is quite standard. Consider a
pair of particles, passing through space-like separated space-time points x1
and x2 respectively. Suppose that one of a set of distinct measurements can
be performed on one or both particles, where each measurement has a set
of distinct outcomes. Then Bells theorem follows from the following three
assumptions:
Locality: The outcome of a measurement on particle 1 at x1 cannot a¤ect
the properties of particle 2 at x2.
Independence: The properties of particle 1 at x1 cannot a¤ect the choice
of measurement performed on particle 2 at x2.
Uniqueness: Every (good) measurement has exactly one outcome.
These assumptions are easy to motivate. According to special relativity,
there is no fact of the matter about which of x1 and x2 occurs earlier in
time, so on the plausible assumption that a cause must occur earlier than
its e¤ect, it is impossible for a cause at x1 to produce an e¤ect at x2. This
ensures the truth of Locality and Independence. And Uniqueness just seems
to express a truism about good measurements: if your measurement somehow
results in more than one of a set of distinct outcomes, then it wasnt a good
measurement! Given these assumptions, Bells theorem follows: when the
particles are prepared in an entangled state, no assignment of properties to
the individual particles can generate the correlations we observe between
measurement outcomes.
But despite the plausibility of the premises, there are reasons indepen-
dent of the emergence debate to think that the conclusion of Bells theorem
is unacceptable. The trouble is that we dont know how to explain the corre-
lations we observe except by appeal to properties of the individual particles.
Holistic properties of the pair of particles dont help in this regard. The
entangled state can be regarded as a holistic property of the pair of parti-
cles. Such a property entails conditionals such as if the outcome of a spin
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measurement on particle 1 in some direction is spin-up, then the outcome of
a spin measurement on particle 2 in the same direction is spin-down. But it
doesnt entail any unconditional measurement outcomes for either particle;
it doesnt explain why the outcome of the spin-measurement on particle 1
was spin-up rather than spin-down (say). To accomplish the latter, we need
an intrinsic property of particle 1. So even if we avail ourselves of holistic
properties, accepting the conclusion of Bells theorem leaves the outcomes of
measurements unexplained.
Given the unacceptability of Bells conclusion, many interpreters of quan-
tum mechanics, including Bell himself, prefer to reject one of his premises.
This restores the possibility of explaining measurement results on entangled
states in terms of the properties of the individual particles, but it also un-
dermines the direct argument for emergence. The surprising thing, perhaps,
is that even though the major interpretations of quantum mechanics violate
one of Bells assumptions, they do not thereby avoid the need to postulate
emergent properties. Let us briey see why.4
Consider rst the Locality assumption. If it fails, then it is straightfor-
ward to arrange that the properties of the individual particles explain the
measurement results we observe: a measurement on particle 1 at x1 changes
the properties of particle 2 at x2, thereby bringing about a correlation be-
tween the measurement results we obtain for particle 1 and particle 2. Two
of the leading interpretations of quantum mechanics, Bohms theory (Bohm
1952) and the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986), violate the
Locality assumption. Hence, one might think, they allow for an explana-
tion of the results of spin-measurements on entangled particles that does not
appeal to holistic properties of the pair.
But in fact this thought is short-lived: a causal theory that exploits non-
local inuences to explain entanglement correlations is hard to come by. The
reason has to do with the particular nature of entanglement. In order to
explain the correlations exhibited by entangled particles, an intervention on
one particle (e.g. a measurement) has to a¤ect the particular distant parti-
cle with which it is entangled. But law-like causal inuences dont work this
way: they a¤ect any particle of a particular type. For example, consider New-
tonian gravitation: the motion of one massive body instantaneously a¤ects
the motion of every other massive body, no matter how distant. In order for
a causal inuence to a¤ect precisely one distant particle, we need to equip
4See Lewis (2016) for more details.
11
our theory with an irreducible relation between the two particles concerned.
That is, non-local theories like Bohm and GRW cant do without emergence.
In each case, the way this emergence is instantiated is that the entangled
quantum state is retained as descriptive of the two-particle system: the en-
tangled state represents a holistic property linking the two particles together.
Then in addition, the theory proposes some new causal machinery connecting
this holistic property to the results we observe. In the case of Bohms theory,
the new machinery is a law that dictates how the quantum state steers
the positions of the particles. The law is non-local, in that the velocity of
each particle depends on the quantum state evaluated at the position of the
other particle so a measurement on one particle can instantaneously a¤ect
the motion of the other. And the dependence of the motion of each particle
on the entangled quantum state shows how a holistic property enforces the
correlations we observe between this particular pair of particles: if one parti-
cle is steered towards a spin-up result, then the holistic connection between
them means that the other is steered towards a spin-down result.
In the case of the GRW theory, the extra machinery is a law that causes
occasional collapses of the quantum state. Again, this law is non-local: a
collapse triggered by a measurement on one particle instantaneously a¤ects
the state of the other. And again, the entangled state of the pair of particles is
essential in explaining why the measurement outcomes for the two particles
are correlated: entanglement means that a collapse centered on a spin-up
result for the rst particle is also a collapse centered on a spin-down result
for the second. So in both GRW and Bohms theory, emergent properties
play an essential role, and the violation of Locality does not threaten the
need for emergence.
Now consider the Uniqueness assumption. If it fails, then we dont need
a special intrinsic property of particle 1 to explain why the outcome of a
spin-measurement on it was spin-up rather than spin-down: instead, we can
say that both outcomes are equally instantiated, and say that the particular
result you see is a consequence your place in the branching structure of reality.
This is the many-worlds approach (Everett 1957; Wallace 2012). Again, one
might think that the violation of Uniqueness allows for an explanation of the
results of measurements on entangled pairs that does not appeal to holistic
properties of the pair.
But again the thought is short-lived, and for the same reason: although
the many-worlds approach obviates the need for intrinsic properties of each
particle, it still requires a special link between precisely this pair of particles
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to explain the correlations observed in each branch of reality. If the spins
of the particles are measured in the same direction, then the branches in
which particle 1 is spin-up are also branches in which particle 2 is spin-
down. Again, the many-world theory retains the entangled quantum state as
descriptive of the two-particle system, representing a holistic property linking
the two-particle system together.5 The many-worlds approach does not add
any additional causal machinery, but instead interprets the quantum state as
describing a branching reality. Even so, the holistic properties are necessary
to provide the requisite structure in the branches to produce the observed
correlations between spin measurement outcomes within each branch.
So all three of the major research programs in the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics embody emergence. In this sense, perhaps, it doesnt mat-
ter whether there is a direct argument for emergence from the formalism of
quantum mechanics itself. Our best theories of the quantum world all exhibit
emergence, and that is enough.
5 The case against emergence
But rst a word of caution. We have not considered violations of the In-
dependence assumption. This oversight can be justied: there is no fully-
developed interpretation of quantum mechanics that succeeds via violating
Independence. But there is an ongoing research program in this direction.
The trick is to nd a way that the properties of one particle can a¤ect the
choice of measurement on the other. Since the measurement can be chosen
freely, you might think that any such theory would threaten free will, or at
least require a kind of global physical conspiracy (Lewis 2006).
But Price (1994) suggests that instead one can regard the free choice of
measurement on the second particle as causing the properties of the rst.
Since the measurement can be chosen after the two particles have been pro-
duced (and to avoid the need for non-local causal inuences),6 this means
that the causal inuence involved runs backwards in time. This is the retro-
5How that holistic property is instantiated in the world is an interesting question. See
Wallace and Timpson (2010) for a concrete proposal.
6That is, according to the retrocausal approach, all causal inuences propagate along
timelike curves, in either the forward or the reverse temporal direction. So there is no
need for direct causal inuences between spacelike separated locations, such as appear in
Bohm and GRW.
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causal approach to quantum mechanics.
The promise of this approach is that it can yield a coherent interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics without the problematic non-locality of Bohm
and GRW, and without the problematic branching reality of many-worlds.
The reason that non-locality in Bohm and GRW is considered problematic
is that it involves a prima facie conict between quantum mechanics and
special relativity. The primary reason that many-worlds branching is consid-
ered problematic is that it is hard to square the probabilistic predictions of
quantum mechanics with a theory in which every outcome occurs (on some
branch of reality). Much has been written to try to mitigate these problems,
but still, it would be nice to be able to avoid them altogether.
How does the retrocausal approach a¤ect the argument for emergence?
The important feature of a retrocausal theory in this regard is that there is
no need to postulate a special holistic property connecting the two particles
involved in the entangled state. There is a direct casual chain connecting the
measurement on the second particle to the properties of the rst, mediated
by the second particle itself. That is, just as a particle can carry traces of
earlier measurements performed on it, so in a retrocausal theory a particle
can carry traces of later measurements performed on it. Entangled particles
are typically produced at a common source, so the second particle can carry
these traces to this common source, and thereby a¤ect the rst particle.7 The
fact that the particles themselves carry the causal inuences means that the
special connection between these two particles is built in to the causal story
via their common origin; there is no need to postulate a holistic property of
the pair to do the job.
Put another way, the retrocausal approach opens up the possibility of a
genuinely epistemic interpretation of the quantum state. The three major
interpretive strategies all take the quantum state as playing a representational
role, and when the state is entangled, what is represented is an irreducible
joint property of the entangled pair. But in the retrocausal approach, it may
be possible to regard the quantum state as a reection of an agents state
of knowledge about a quantum system. When the state is entangled, this
just means that the agents knowledge includes irreducible conditionals e.g.
knowledge that the second particle is spin-down in a given direction if the
7The phenomenon of entanglement swapping complicates this story a little, as the two
entangled particles at the end of the experiment do not have a common souce (Ma et al.
2012). However, retrocausal theories can easily handle such cases too (Price and Wharton
2015).
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rst particle is spin-up in that direction. But each particle can still carry its
own intrinsic spin property, unknown to the agent.
The retrocausal approach vividly illustrates why there is no direct ar-
gument from the quantum formalism to the existence of emergence. Since
denying the Independence assumption is possible, there is no reason in princi-
ple that the correlations exhibited by entangled pairs could not be explained
without emergent properties. But it should be stressed that, while this ex-
planatory strategy is perfectly coherent, it cannot at present be embedded
within a fully developed retrocausal interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The research program is not at a stage yet where it can deliver measurement
outcomes that are demonstrably equivalent to those of standard quantum
mechanics.8
6 Conclusion
Quantum mechanics is the best place to look for emergence, and it is the
worst place to look for emergence. It is the best place to look insofar as
the phenomenon of entanglement provides measurement outcomes that resist
explanation in terms of the intrinsic properties of the particles involved. But
it is the worst place to look insofar as constructing explanations in quantum
mechanics is strongly interpretation dependent, and the interpretation of
quantum mechanics is still a matter of controversy.
Still, we can say this much. First, interpretive strategies that challenge
the intuitive division of systems into wholes made up of smaller parts do not
undermine arguments for emergence based on quantum mechanics, because
the sense of partand wholeappearing in the denition of emergence are
the ordinary ones, not the technical notion that might be the result of such a
challenge. Second, there is no direct argument from the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics to emergence: the possibility of violating the Independence
assumption provides a counterexample to such an argument. But third, there
is an indirect argument for emergence, in that all the well-developed inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics involve emergent properties as a crucial
part of their explanation of measurement outcomes for entangled systems.
8Retrocausal research programs include the transactional interpretation of Cramer
(1986) and Kastner (2012), the two-vector formalism of Aharonov and Vaidman (1990),
the retrocausal Bohmian approach of Sutherland (2008), the classical wave approach of
Wharton (2010), and the particle-based approach of Price (2012).
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In this sense, quantum mechanics gives us good reason to think that the
world contains emergent properties.
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